Towards an Internet Bill of Rights by De Minico, Giovanna
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
7-1-2015
Towards an Internet Bill of Rights
Giovanna De Minico
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Giovanna De Minico, Towards an Internet Bill of Rights, 37 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2015).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol37/iss1/1




Towards an Internet Bill of Rights 
GIOVANNA DE MINICO 
I. SOME QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED 
This work seeks to spark some questions about what rules might 
be set up for the Internet and what the goals of these rules should be. 
The first question examined is whether a binding regulation of the 
Internet is required. This debate is mainly propelled by the American 
doctrine,
1
 a doctrine divided between the champions of unchecked self-
regulation—drawn by the network providers themselves
2
—and those in 
favour of an absorbing intervention by an authority.
3
 The second ques-
tion explored is whether a binding regulation would require a formal 
modification of national Constitutions eschewing any reference to the 
Internet. This article intends to detail and explore a third alternative: the 
proposal of a specific and supranational “Bill of rights” for the Internet. 
This proposal prompts further questions: which legislative body 
should write this Bill? What should the relationship be between binding 
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Villone (Federico II, Naples) for many stimulating suggestions. I would also like to thank the 
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during the editing process. 
 1. DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM 97-100 (2009). 
 2. JOHN MATHIASON, INTERNET GOVERNANCE: THE NEW FRONTIER OF GLOBAL 
INSTITUTIONS 70-96 (2009); see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of 
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1371-1380 (1996). 
 3. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), 
http://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html; Joel Reidenberg, Governing Networks and 
Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 913 (1996) (discussing paternalism). For a bal-
anced critique to this approach, see ANDREW MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: 
CONTROL IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT (2006). Others prefer a transfer of the offline rules 
to the online universe while others reconsider the necessity of an ad hoc regulation in the case of 
human rights. Compare Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 
(2007) with Robin Mansell, Human Rights and Equity in Cyberspace, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 1-10 (Andrew D. Murray & Matthias Klang eds., 2004). 
DE MINICO_FINAL_FOR_PUB (DO NOT DELETE) 9/8/2015  1:40 PM 
2 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 37:1 
 
rules and the policies of self-regulation? What kind of content would be 
appropriate or necessary to put in the Bill? Should the Bill give greater 
weight to fundamental rights than to economic interests? Should supra-
national case law be a contributing source to the Bill, and if so, to what 
extent? 
To answer these questions, I will not simply tackle a single free-
dom concerning netizens. This article’s analysis will instead focus on 
the basic need that fundamental rights, normally protected by national 
constitutions, should receive universal protection regardless of its terri-
torial boundaries, in accordance with the a-territorial nature of the Inter-
net. Therefore, rather than focusing on specific rights, whether they be 
freedom of expression, communication, or the right to access the Inter-
net,
4
 this article intends to propose the essentials of a statute for funda-
mental rights, one that is sufficiently general to encompass every free-
dom, regardless of its specific features. This statute should also be 
supranational so that every freedom is consistent regardless of the vari-
ances in different nations. This would also ensure equality of treatment. 
National instances have given rise to a fragmented and irregular ju-
ridical mosaic. Since national legislations are primarily based on the 
specific problems of each legal system and tradition, they therefore vary 
in scope and content. The U.S. juridical tradition, for instance, has given 
particular relevance to some norms
5
 that help set the boundaries for pub-
lic powers on copyright law. In the U.K., this same problem has been 
tackled by essentially looking at the relationships between soft law and 
binding rules in order to affirm the primacy of a binding framework,
6
 in 
particular, a new copyright concept well-suited to the digital age.
7
 In 
France, in the absence of more comprehensive rules, the attention of 
then-President Sarkozy turned toward the publishing interests of record 
 
 4. Giovanna De Minico, New Social Rights and Internet: Which Policies Combine Them, 
15 INTER. COMM. L. REV. 261 (2013). For a wide overview on specific rights, see Michael 
Boardman, Digital Copyright Protection and Graduated Response: A Global Perspective, 33 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 235-243 (2011) [hereinafter Digital Copyright Protection 
and Graduated Response: A Global Perspective].  
 5. S. 968 112
th
 Cong., (2011); See also S. 3261 112
TH
 Congress; See Annemarie Bridy, 
Copyright Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: A Discourse-Theoretic Perspective 
on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105
TH 
Congress, Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, October 28, 1998 (better known as DMCA, this is an example of regulation). 
 6. For a discussion of possible relationships between self-regulation and binding rules, see 
Julia Black, Constitutionalizing self-regulation, MOD. L. REV. 1, 27 (1996). 
 7. JERRY JIE HUA, TOWARD A MORE BALANCED APPROACH: RETHINKING AND 
READJUSTING COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS IN THE DIGITAL NETWORK ERA 141 (Heidelberg: Springer, 
2014). 
DEMINICO - FINAL FOR PUB (DO NOT DELETE) 9/8/2015  1:40 PM 
2015] Towards an Internet Bill of Rights 3 
 
and film companies, which led to a legislation in 2009 that primarily fo-
cused on creating stringent copyright protection.
8
 In Italy, a substantial 
lack of legislative attention on Internet-related issues has been super-
seded by a very controversial initiative by the competent national Au-
thority.
9
 Finally, the European Court of Justice has extensively used the 
European Union Regulation on E-Commerce addressing the issue of In-
ternet Service Provider accountability.
10
 
These instances clearly prove the existence of an uneven frame-
work born out of occasional pressures and initiatives. This further un-
derlines the necessity of general regulations that extend beyond both na-
tional boundaries and the sectional interests prevailing in any given 
moment. A comprehensive view of the possible answers will support 
the assertion that all technical issues concerning the Internet cannot be 
left to the invisible hand of a market-oriented technological develop-
ment, rather, it should be goal-oriented towards achieving a common 
good. Should this happen, the Internet would finally be a unique and ef-
fective opportunity for everyone to pursue personal growth and partici-
pation in the virtual political process. Such an outcome, however, can 
only be ensured through clear choices made by policymakers and 
netizens. To outline which choices should be adopted, and how they 
should be adopted, is the main goal of this article. 
 
 8. In the doctrine : Michael Boardman, Digital Copyright Protection and Graduated Re-
sponse: A Global Perspective, supra note 4, at 228-229. 
See Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur inter-
net [Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 in favor of the districtuion and protection of Copyright on 
the Internet], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF FRANCE], 
available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020735432&categorieLie
n=id. On this law the Conseil Constitutionnel intervened with the Décision n° 2009-580 DC, 10 
june 200 and declared the unconstitutionality of the provisions 5 and 11, at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/2009/2009-580-dc/decision-n-2009-580-dc-du-10-juin-
2009.42666.html. 
 9. The Authority for Communication Guarantees of Italy (AGCOM) adopted a controver-
sial regulation on Internet copyright. See Delibera n. 680/13/CONS [Deliberation n. 
680/13/CONS], available at http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?DocID=12228. A closer look will 
be given to this act in the following pages of this work, infra parag. 3.1. 
 10. See Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et 
éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-11959 available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=153683; see also Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-
238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2467, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=83961&pageIndex=0&doclang
=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=154007. 
See generally Mario Viola De Azavedo Cunha et al., Peer-to-peer privacy violations and ISP 
liability:data protection in the user-generated web, INT’L DATA PRIVACY L., 50, 55-58 (2012). 
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II. THE AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES: SELF-REGULATION OR BINDING 
RULES? 
The first step of the inquiry is to consider whether a heteronomous 
system of regulation, or self-regulation, should be pursued for the Inter-




A direct connection exists between the legal value of self-
regulation and its conformity with the relevant legal systems.
12
 Acts of 
self-regulation, if public powers adequately defined their content and if 
authority is vested onto its authors, deserve a place in the conversation 
next to binding sources. This is contrary to the case of unfettered self-
regulations. 
There may be the case of a State leaving all initiative to private 
bodies, getting involved only when self-regulation is missing. This form 
of self-regulation takes place within the limits of the freedom of negoti-
ation,
13
 as long as no problem arises, the State does not directly inter-
vene. Nevertheless, the fact that the state may act turns that absence into 
a potential presence on the assumption that “if nothing is done State ac-
tion will follow.”
14
 This self-regulation model may be defined as “inde-
pendent” from the law since the law is entirely lacking, even as a mini-
mal framework for the inter partes negotiation.
15
 This is a historically 
regressive model.
16
 Private stakeholders, when left by themselves, have 




 11. LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 118-20 (2004). 
 12. See Anthony Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation, 15 OX. J. L. STUD. 97-108 (1995) [here-
inafter Rethinking Self-Regulation]; see also Anthony I. Ogus, Regulatory Paternalism: When is 
it Justified, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATION, STATES, AND MARKETS 
IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US 304-20 (Klaus J. Hoptet al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Regulatory 
Paternalism]. 
 13. Rethinking Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 101. 
 14. ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, 
STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 126 (1999). 
 15. Giovanna De Minico, A Hard Look at Self-Regulation in the UK, 1 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 
211 (2006) [hereinafter A Hard Look] (I classified this model as “independent” because the term 
appropriately describes a regulation operating outside of a legal framework, therefore coming 
close to a praeterlegem rulemaking); see also Linda Senden, Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-
Regulation in European Law: Where Do They Meet?, 9.1 ELEC. J. COMP. L. 12 (2005). 
 16. A Hard Look, supra note 15, at 188-89. The example of financial markets can show that 
when objective values are at stake, such as the good name of single markets, the trust in a free 
trade economy and the safety of private savings, the English legislature did no longer rely on one-
sided regulation. It deeply changed self-regulatory models with the purpose of making public 
regulatory powers prevail.  
 17. See John Kay & John Vickers, Regulatory Reform: An Appraisal, in DEREGULATION OR 
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Therefore, the achievement of the common good depends on whenever 
it, by chance, happens to correspond with private interests. 
In a different model, the State entrusts meaningful social tasks to a 
private body while continuing to regulate the overall legal structure and 
decision-making process.
18
  Without maintaining ultimate authority, 
there would be no guarantees that the task entrusted to the private body 
would be successfully fulfilled. In such a case, self-regulation becomes 
an instrument in the hands of public entities where the involved private 
body is nothing more than an expression of indirect administration.
19
 
Despite that, an exchange is nevertheless realized between the private 
stakeholders and the State; the private stakeholders relinquish in whole, 
or in part, their regulating and managing autonomy while the State vests 
in the private stakeholders the total, or partial, enforcing power typically 
granted by the law. 
The question then becomes, what model of regulation would be 
better suited for the internet: a self-regulating one independent from the 
law or a self-regulation model shaped by binding law that functions as 
part of the legal system? 
An answer cannot be wholly in favour of self regulation or binding 





 have looked for a solution to the regulation issue in 
four constraints: “the law, social norms, the market and architecture”. A 
good example of how these constraints should mix is shown by the evo-
 
RE-REGULATION?: REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 239 (Gian-
domenico Majone ed., 1990), (“[Private bodies] “may claim that their objectives are in line with 
the public interest, but whether or not this is so will depend on the frameworks in which they op-
erate.”). 
 18. BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 14, at 125-126. 
 19. Sometimes there might be a definitional rather than substantial difference. For instance, 
the Italian legal tradition typically refers to a concept of “indirect administration” which comes 
close to the concourse among the binding sources and self-regulation set forth by Anthony Ogus 
in his article, Rethinking Self-Regulation. The author clearly explains the role of the State: to 
promote the competition between the S.R.A. and “lay down a minimum quality standards which 
the S.R.A. regimes must presumptively satisfy” Rethinking Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 
106. 
 20. See, e.g., Charles D. Raab & Paul De Hert, Tools for Technology Regulation: Seeking 
Analytical Approaches Beyond Lessig and Hood, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL 
FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 236 (Roger Brownsword & Karen 
Yeung eds., 2008); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 216 (2007); 
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 125-26 (2008); 
ANDREW MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW: THE LAW AND SOCIETY 62-66 (2010) 
[hereinafter MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW]. 
 21. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 122-32 (2006) [hereinafter  CODE: VERSION 
2.0]. 
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lution of piracy in the Internet. Here two values face each other: the 
copyright holder’s right to an adequate revenue, and the right of Internet 
users to freely access websites.
22
 Criminal sanctions alone proved to be 
largely ineffective, because the illegal download from Internet was not 
considered socially reprehensible.
23
 A turnabout occurred with policies 
of substantial price reductions for legal purchases, also due to the intro-
duction of creative commons licensing,
24
 to the construction of which 
scholars gave an essential support.
25
 Creative Commons offers copyright 
holders a simple way to mark their creative works with the freedoms 
they intend for it to carry: “[t]hat mark is a license which reserves to the 
author some rights, while dedicating to the public rights that otherwise 
would have been held privately. As these licenses are nonexclusive and 
public, they too effectively build a commons of creative resources that 
anyone can build upon.”
26
 The final outcome was that Internet users 
deemed that paying a reasonably low price for legal purchases was more 
convenient than facing the possibility of heavy criminal sanctions. 
Creative Commons contributed greatly in preventing criminal be-
havior since they helped educate the community of web surfers to be 
lawful by offering them a chance to have their way at a low cost. 
In modern societies pluralism is a basic principle, not by chance a 
cornerstone of the regulatory issue in the Internet. This principle is con-
strued here in the terms of different sources of law, both public and pri-
vate, concurring in the regulation. But pluralism must be measured 
against the necessity of a legal system,
27
 i.e. a coherent and comprehen-
sive set of rules. The compatibility is generally assured in European 
Civil Law countries through the notion that the sources of law are 
placed in a hierarchical order
28
 specified at a constitutional level. But 
 
 22. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 78 (2004), available at http://www.free-
culture.cc/freeculture.pdf (“we should be securing income to artists while we allow the market to 
secure the most efficient way to promote and distribute content . . . . [T]hese changes should be 
designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong public interest that innovation 
continue.”) [hereinafter FREE CULTURE]. 
 23. MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW, supra note 19, at 62-64.  
 24. CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION: EUROPEAN LAW, 
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN CYBERSPACE 90-91 (2011); See generally 
MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 186-254 (THE 
MIT PRESS 2003). 
 25. Lawrence Lessig, Creative Commons @ 5 Years, CREATIVE COMMONS (Oct. 1, 2007), 
http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/7693 [hereinafter Creative Commons]. 
 26. LESSIG, CODE, supra note 18, at 199. 
 27. See, for all, the classic contribution by SANTI ROMANO, L’ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO 
(The Legal System), Sansoni, Firenze, III ed. 1977 (first published in 1918), spec. chap. I.  
 28. See FEDERICO SORRENTINO, Le fonti del diritto italiano (The sources of the Italian 
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also the American experience should be read as posing a precise order 
between heteronomy and private law.
29
  The latter may integrate the po-
litical decision-making initiated by the former, but is not allowed to to-
tally take its place and initiate that decision-making by itself.
30
 
A question arises here about which role should be reserved to the 
State. 
It should not be called to act as a regulator in detail of individual 
behaviour, but rather as an overall system architect, intervening before 
and after self-regulation.  Ex ante, the State will define the general rules, 
the goals to be pursued, the values to be fulfilled. Ex post, it will be in 
the State’s responsibility to correct any deviation of private regulations 
from the rules it has preliminarily set. 
More specifically, the relative weight of heteronomy upon self-
regulation will grow together with the capacity of the negotiated law to 
seek erga-omnes effects extending its application to a wider community 
than the one which it directly represents,
31
 In such a case it will fall up-
on the State to look into the structure and the organization of the private 
subjects in order that an adequate representativeness, transparency, and 
democratic decision-making processes may be insured.
32
 The necessity 
for the State to intervene is given by the substantial equivalence be-
tween private regulation and a properly legal source of law. 
Conclusively, in a correct order, law comes first, self-regulation 
follows. If the order is inverted, the inherently secondary nature of self-
regulation with respect to the law will be merely fictitious.
33
 Self-
regulation will absorb a substantial law-making role and will be applied 
as a fully legal source of law. Damages to the constitutional architecture 
will be inevitable. 
Nevertheless, it may happen that the correct relationship between 
 
Law), Cedam, Padova, II ed., 2015, pp, 31-32. 
 29. See generally W. Cesarini Sforza & Salvatore Romano, Il Diritto Dei Privati [The Law 
of Privates], in 5 CIVILTÀ DEL DIRITTO [CIVILIZATION OF LAW] (1963).  
 30. See generally De Minico, A Hard Look, supra note 13, at 197-200 (discussing the rela-
tionship between binding and consensual law).   
 31. Black, supra note 6, at 30, 32. With specific reference to the Internet, see Jonathan Cave, 
Policy and regulatory requirements for a future Internet, IN RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET 161 (2013). 
 32. ROLF H. WEBER ET AL., SHAPING INTERNET GOVERNANCE: REGULATORY 
CHALLENGES 105 (2009); see also, JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE 
INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 17 (2006). 
 33. A detailed analysis may be found in a previous work of mine – GIOVANNA DE MINICO,  
REGOLE. COMANDO E CONSENSO 125 (2005) (It.). Chapter four of that book is dedicated entirely 
to this issue. 
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heteronomy and self-regulation be subverted.
34
 France came close to it 
during Sarkozy’s term in office
35
 due to the President’s belief that self-
regulation would be the cure for all the ills of the Internet.
36
 If in follow-
ing such a myth a full control of the internet should be vested upon pri-
vate interest governments,
37
 a corporativistic involution of the net would 
inevitably ensue. The rules would be shaped in close accordance with 
those private economic interests. 
A reference to net neutrality
38
 is also in order. A conflict is under 
way between two competing rights. On one hand, the right of Broad-
band providers to sell the access to the Internet at different prices; on 
the other, the consumers’ right to choose services, devices, applications 
and contents in accordance of their taste and regardless of connection 
speed. This is the basic playground of what is generally defined as net 
neutrality, and offers a good test for the relationship between heterono-
my and self regulation. 
In the U.S.A the conflict has fostered two different answers. The 
first one entrusts a public body, i.e. the Federal Communication Com-
mission (hereinafter F.C.C.), 
39
  with a light regulation requiring broad-
band providers not to block access, degrade, or favor any legal content, 
applications, services, or non-harmful devices over others. The second 
one remits to the negotiations between the broadband provider and the 
 
 34. See MARSDEN, supra note 24, at 58.  
 35. See, N. Sarkozy, Opening of the eG8 Forum: Address by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of 
the French Republic, May 24, 2011, Paris, at 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/eg8/eg8-sarkozy-en.html. 
Among newspapers’ articles, see: K.WILLSHER, Sarkozy opens ‘historic’ forum on future of in-
ternet in runup to G8, at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/may/24/sarkozy-opens-e-
g8-summit; E.P Fannermay,  G-8 Leaders to Call for Tighter Internet Regulation, 24, 2011, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/technology/25tech.html?_r=1 
 36. For contrasting approaches by the U.S. and France, see G8 Summit, Deauville G8 Decla-
ration Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy (May 26-27, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/deauville_declaration_final_-_eng_8h.pdf. 
 37. See Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter, Community, market, state – and asso-
ciations? The prospective contribution of interest governance to social order, in PRIVATE 
INTEREST GOVERNMENT BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 16 (Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. 
Schmitter eds., 1985). 
 38. A clear and comprehensive definition of the net neutrality was given by the Federal 
Communication Commission. See Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 
FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906 (2010), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-
10-201A1_Rcd.pdf [hereinafter Preserving the Open Internet]. For a recent synthesis, see 
KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 351(Routledge 6th ed. 2014). 
 39. See Federal Communications Commission, REPORT AND ORDER. ACT TO PRESERVE 
INTERNET FREEDOM AND OPENNESS, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-
201A1_Rcd.pdf; The Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Robert M. McDowell may be found 
at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0822/FCC-12-92A3.pdf. 
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content provider the quality and speed of the connection. In such a case, 
the negotiation is incompatible with the consumer’s right to a free 
choice, and therefore, a right to the net in a strict sense does not exist 
anymore. 
On the question of what net neutrality should be, the FCC has re-
peatedly spoken on, and has recently launched, a rulemaking procedure 
on how best an open Internet can be protected and promoted.
40
 The 
opening question was: “[w]hat is the right public policy to ensure that 
the Internet remains open?” Two options were set forth. The first one 
was to maintain the existing regulatory approach. Under the second one, 
the cable and phone companies would be required to provide a basic 
and equal level of unfettered Internet service to their broadband sub-
scribers, beyond which they would be allowed to charge different fees 
for a faster delivery to consumers. It was objected that the second option 
allowing the distinction between basic and premium offerings would 
have divided the Internet into the “haves” and the “have-nots”. 
The first solution has finally prevailed
41
: a really open Internet 
governed by public rules resistant to the economic interests of broad-




The examples made so far show a self-regulation secondary to 
binding law. But they also show a pluralistic environment of which self-
regulation is a necessary element. Teubner’s theory
43
 on porous law may 
be recalled here. The basic assumption is that the State is unable to keep 
 
 40. See FCC LAUNCHES BROAD RULEMAKING ON HOW BEST TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE 
THE OPEN INTERNET, FCC (May 15, 2014), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/document/protecting-and-promoting-open-internet-nprm. 
We can note that the Obama Administration took a cautious stand to this conflict. Haley Sweet-
land Edwards, Obama Backs Away From Net Neutrality Campaign Promises After FCC Vote, 
TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/101794/obama-backs-away-from-net-neutrality-campaign-
promises-after-fcc-vote/. 
 41. See  Federal Communications Commission, STRONG, SUSTAINABLE RULES TO 
PROTECT THE OPEN INTERNET, February 26, 2015, at 
http://www.arentfox.com/sites/default/files/DOC-302200A1.pdf 
 42. The FCC decision was taken with a narrow three-two majority and the opposing com-
missioners made it clear they would keep fighting against the decision.  
With regards to the matter see: Rudy Takala,  Seven Lawsuits Now Pending Against FCC Over 
‘Net Neutrality’ Rule, at http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/rudy-takala/seven-lawsuits-now-
pending-against-fcc-over-net-neutrality-rule; JOSH TAYLOR, Net neutrality decision ‘monumen-
tally flawed’: FCC commissioner, at http://www.zdnet.com/article/net-neutrality-decision-
monumentally-flawed-fcc-commissioner/. 
 43. See GUNTHER TEUBNER ET AL., LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 100, 139-140 (Ruth 
Adler trans., 1993). 
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an effective monopoly of lawmaking. It therefore acknowledges its own 
limitations, allowing other subjects
44
 the power to write rules for indi-
vidual and collective behaviors which are subsequently taken up as part 
of the legal system. This is the theory of reflexive law, which correctly 
describes the experience of modern legal systems, although attention 
must be paid to avoiding some possible excesses.
45
 Reflexive law finds 
an appropriate structural solution in a pluralistic architecture in which a 
higher-level legal system – the State – encompasses one or more auton-
omous legal subsystems, which exist and operate within the limits es-
tablished by the former.
46
 In this perspective the subsystems are neces-
sarily secondary to the higher-level legal system, and the role of private 
subjects may be differently defined as far as scope, procedures, effects 
are concerned. A French author has depicted the private contribution as 
limited to the “mise en oeuvre des politiques publiques”  (the imple-
mentation of public policies).
47
 In any case, the State maintains a full 
authority
48
 and a final word on the system as a whole, although relin-
quishing the role of exclusive lawmaker, 
The circle is now complete: political decision-makers and public 
powers should keep their leadership in the self-regulating processes, in-
tervening with ex ante determination of its goals, and ex-post control 
and correction. 
A measure of heteronomous regulation is necessary. But a question 
is open: which should the scope and content of this regulation be? 
As far as the Internet is concerned, the starting point is found in the 
 
 44. See A Hard Look, supra note 15, at 198 (“Hence, private associations must promote pol-
icies adjusting self-regulation from the beginning to social purposes . . .  and the State claims ‘the 
chance of political decision’ though respecting ‘the organised power to act of social bodies.”).  
 45. See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 239, 278 (1982-1983) [hereinafter Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern 
Law]; see generally GUNTHER TEUBNER & ALBERTO FEBBRAJO, STATE, LAW, AND ECONOMY 
AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS, (Dott. A. Giuffré ed., 1992); see also GUNTHER TEUBNER, 
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE, (Walter de Gruyter ed., 1986); and see RENATE 
MAYNYZ, STEUERUNG, STEUERUNGSAKTEURE UND STEUERENGSINSTRUMENTE: ZUR 
PRÄZISIERUNG DES PROBLEMS (CONTROL, CONTROL ACTORS AND STEUERENGSINSTRUMENTE: 
TO CLARIFY THE PROBLEMS) 24, 70 (1986). 
 46. Walter L. Bühl, Grenzen der Autopoiesis [Limits of autopoeiesis], in 39 KÖLNER 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIOLOGIE UND SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE 247 (1987). 
 47. Charles-Albert Morand, La contractualisation corporatiste de la formation et de la mise 
en oeuvre du droit [The corporatist contracting training and implementation of the law], in 
L’ETAT PROPULSIF. CONTRIBUTION À L’ETUDE DESINSTRUMENTS D’ACTION D’ETAT [STATE 
PROPULSION CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY INSTRUMENTS ACTION STATE] 207 (Charles Albert 
ed., 1991). 
 48. THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 3, at 250-251. 
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Courts’ decisions – both the European Court of Human Rights
49
 and the 
U.S. Supreme Court
50
 – affirming that rules should be specifically suited 
to their object. Therefore, offline media regulations cannot as such be 
made applicable online.
51
 Should this happen, the Internet would lose its 
uniqueness. Furthermore, an unfettered Internet is essential to the circu-
lation of ideas which is a basic instrument of economic and social 
growth.
52
 As a consequence, regulations should be kept at a minimum 
level. 
Regulation of the Internet is thus faced with the supreme value of 
the marketplace of ideas
53
 resembling a transposition of the economic 
theory of laissez-faire on the ground of an exchange of immaterial 
goods. Freedom of speech imposes itself as the unique and real corner-
stone of democracy. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that “gov-
ernmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere 
with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”
54
 As the Supreme 
Court stated in the ACLU the assumption that in a democratic society 
censorship may prove beneficial is “theoretical but unproven.”
55
 
 For the first time in the history of mankind, billions of people can 
easily communicate and share information through the Internet, and 
there can be no overwhelming public or private interest justifying the 
substantial curtailment of the Internet’s effectiveness. Therefore, a basic 
principle can be drawn stating that a regulation of the Internet, even 
when required should be kept as light and unobtrusive as possible. 
  
 
 49. Animal Defenders Int. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48876/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013) 
(forthcoming in European Human Rights Review). 
 50. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
 51. The United State Supreme Court has recognized that the “differences in the characteris-
tics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.” Associ-
ates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 135-36 (9th Cir. 1971) (citation omitted); 
see, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U.S. 546, 557 (1975); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 
(1989). 
 52. See Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opin-
ion and expression, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013) (Frank La 
Rue), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.4
0_EN.pdf, in which the author exposes serious concerns for the practices adopted by many States 
aimed at keeping the Internet under close surveillance and control. 
 53. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Wendell, J., dissenting). 
 54. Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.  
 55. Id.  
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III. WHY SHOULD THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE INTERNET BE 
NECESSARY? 
With a general framework for the internet drawn up, one question 
remains: is it then necessary to update those national Constitutions that 
do not mention the Internet at all? 
As a starting point, three Constitutions—namely the Italian, French 
and American ones—will be discussed, as they already entail norms 
protecting traditional media - radio, television, and newspapers - yet at 
the same time lack specific rules for online media such as Internet blogs 
and social network websites.
56
 
More specifically, in the Italian Constitution art. 15 (freedom of 
communication) and art. 21 (freedom of speech)
57
 do not refer to the In-
ternet at all. This is easily explained considering that the constitutional 
formulas have remained unchanged since 1948. Recently, there has 
been considerable debate among scholars about the necessity of intro-
ducing new ad hoc provisions
58
 through a constitutional reform. 
It can be argued against the thesis of a formal revision that any 
new formula would be focused on the existing technology, and could 
not easily cover the inevitable and unforeseeable future developments. 
This would expose any constitutional innovation to the risk of 
premature obsolescence: a detailed provision might be useful today, but 
useless, or even harmful, tomorrow. It should be further noted that the 
 
 56. Only two Constitutions dealt with new media through explicit provisions, see 2008 
SYNTAGMA [SYN.][CONSTITUTION] 5a, co.2 (Greece) and CONSTITUCION DE REPÚBLICA DEL 
ECUADOR [C.R] art. 16. 
 57. See Art. 15 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“Freedom and confidentiality of correspondence 
and of every other form of communication is inviolable. Limitations may only be imposed by 
judicial decision stating the reasons and in accordance with the guarantees provided by the law.”). 
Article 21, the only article relevant here, states: “Anyone has the right to freely express their 
thoughts in speech, writing, or any other form of communication.” Id. art. 21. 
 58. Concerning the previous Leg. XVI, see the “disegno di legge costituzionale, A.S. n. 
2475, 6/12/2010, at http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/36202.htm [hereinafter Pro-
ject of constitutional law 2475/2010]. Among scholars, see Stefano Rodotà, Il mondo della rete. 
Quali diritti e quali vincoli [THE WORLD IN THE NET. WHAT RIGHTS AND WHAT CONSTRAINTS] 
(2014).  
Concerning the current Leg. XVII, see the “disegno di legge costituzionale, A.S. 1317, 17/2/2014, 
at  http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/43981.htm [hereinafter Project of constitu-
tional law 1317/2014] and also the “disegno di legge costituzionale, A.S. 1561, 10/7/2014, at 
http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/44665.htm [hereinafter Project of constitutional 
law 1561/2014]. In doctrine  see: O.Pollicino, ‘Esame in sede referente dei DDL 1317 e 1561 
(diritto di accesso ad Internet)’,  at http://www.medialaws.eu/esame-in-sede-referente-dei-ddl-
1317-e-1561-diritto-di-accesso-ad-internet/ and G. De Minico, ‘A proposito dei disegni di legge 
di revisione costituzionale, A.S. 1561 e 1317, I Commissione del Senato, Leg. XVII, 10/3/2015’ 
(forthcoming). 
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real focus of Internet regulation is found—as it will be explained more 
extensively later—in the identification of a supranational rule-maker. A 
national Constitution, applicable within the territory of a single State, 
might be an obstacle in the broader perspective of a discipline that en-
compasses a number of States with different legislative histories, expe-
riences, and economic and social interests. From this point of view, a 
specific and detailed constitutional provision might not be the right an-
swer. 
An alternative is found in adopting a broad interpretation of the ex-




This approach would be made easier by the inherent flexibility of 
many Constitutional provisions.
60
 This is the case of art. 15 and 21 of 
the Italian Constitution, which grant protection to named media, but al-
so refer respectively to “every other form of communication” (Art. 15) 
and “any other means of communication” (Art. 21).
61
 
A similar example is given by the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution,
62
 which has been construed in the sense that the Internet is 
fully within the constitutional safeguards of the freedom of speech.
63
 No 
reform of the Amendment has been deemed necessary. 
The extension of the same constitutional protection to rights and 
liberties offline and online does not imply an automatic transfer of the 
offline discipline, as a whole, in the world of virtual reality. As it has 
been argued previously, this would not be effective and would only un-
dermine the uniqueness of the Internet. The extension considered here is 
limited to the basic constitutional guarantees of rights and liberties, 
while a different sub-constitutional regulation may remain to be provid-
 
 59. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the 
Electronic Frontier, Electronic Privacy Information Center (1991), at  
http://epic.org/free_speech/tribe.html. 
 60. On the issue of the flexible structure of many Constitutional provisions see GIUSTIZIA 
CONSTITUZIONALE 246 (Gustavo Zagrebelsky & Valeria Marceno eds., 2012). 
 61. Arts. 15, 21 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.). This is a typical example of a flexible provision. 
The interpreter should be able to read it as encompassing new forms or means of communication 
previously unheard of, made available by technological innovation. This text remains unchanged 
while staying adherent to new conditions. 
 62. Among the first on the elasticity of the text and the discretionary power, Justice Harlan 
stated, “I do not see why Congress should not be able as well to exercise its ‘discretion’ by enact-
ing statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.” 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 669 (1966); see also JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1184 (1997). 
 63. See supra note 51. 
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ed in detail. This point will be made clear by a closer look at the Italian 
and U.S. Constitutions, with different specific provisions but, similar 
problems posed by the new virtual reality. 
A. From the “law clause” to the “rule of law” of the international 
system 
I shall start by examining the basic safeguards provided by the Ital-
ian Constitution for fundamental rights and liberties offline. 
 In the Italian Constitution a basic guarantee of rights and liberties 
is found in the law clause (“riserva di legge”),
64
 by which a primary leg-
islative rule must be adopted first,
65
 while a secondary rule may be 
adopted subsequently and only within limits necessarily defined by the 
former.
66
 In matters concerning copyright and the Internet, Legislative 
Decree n. 44/2010
67
does not comply with this principle, vesting upon 
the Authority for the Guarantee of Communication,
68
 a general respon-
sibility, without defining in detail the Authority’s powers. In the ab-
sence of a specific legislative foundation, the Authority itself (Delibera-
tion N. 680/13/CONS)
69
 has assumed to have the power of closing 
websites or requiring that some contents be cancelled, following a 
summary assessment of their illicit nature .The Authority’s decision is a 
secondary source, and therefore in virtue of the “law clause” is not al-
lowed to introduce an original innovation in the legal system without an 
adequate foundation in a primary source.
70
 Consequently, the compli-
 
 64. G. ZAGREBELSKY, Il sistema costituzionale delle fonti del diritto, (The constitutional 
system of the law sources) (Torino: Giappichelli, 1984) 84-87; also L. Carlassare, I regolamenti 
dell’Esecutivo e principio di legalità [The rules of the Government and the legality principle] 
(Padova: Cedam, 1966) 223; E. Cheli, Potere regolamentare e struttura costituzionale [Regula-
tion power and Constitutional structure] (Milano: Giuffrè, 1977) 50  
 65. A primary source is construed by the Italian doctrine as a regulatory will expressed by a 
constitutional power specifically vested with political functions. This source has the basic task to 
define and initiate the policy project that will be developed by the secondary sources (see for all 
the clear pages written by V. CRISAFULLI, Lezioni di diritto costituzionale (Lessons of constitu-
tional law), 2
nd
 vol., (Padova: Cedam, 1993), 140-159. 
 66. Because of this secondary nature, some scholars have stated that in force of the legality 
principle, a previous provision of law conferring a blank power to the secondary source is not 
sufficient. The law must intervene indicating the aim, the scope, and the guidelines with which 
the secondary power is required to comply. So G.U. Rescigno, ‘Sul principio di legalita’ [Around 
the legality principle]19 (1995) Dir. Pubbl., pp. 264-265. 
 67. Decreto Legislativo 15 marzo 2010, n. 44, in G.U. 29 marzo 2010, n. 73 (It.)  
 68. From now on: A.G.Com. 
 69. Delibera N. 680/13/CONS [Deliberation n. 680/13/CONS], at 
http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?DocID=12228 
 70. G. De Minico, ‘Indipendenza delle autorità o indipendenza dei regolamenti? Lettura in 
parallelo all’esperienza comunitaria’ (Independence of the Authorities or independence of the 
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ance with the law clause and the hierarchy principle of both the Legisla-
tive Decree 44/2010 and the Authority’s Deliberation may be ques-
tioned. 
The Italian case may recall the French law Hadopi 1,
71
 by which a 
decision-making power upon websites is given to an independent au-
thority.
72
 In a comparative context, a safeguard for the protection of hu-
man rights substantially equivalent but not identical to the Italian Con-
stitution’s “law clause”
73
 may be found in the “rule of law”.
74
 This 
means that the discipline of fundamental rights must be prescribed by a 
law that is “adequately accessible”
75
 and “formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct.”
76
 A close scruti-
ny reveals a notable difference between the international principle and 
the Italian clause. In the perspective of the “rule of law”, the secondary 




regulations? A comparative reading with the European experience), in M. D’Amico e B. Randaz-
zo (eds) , Alle frontiere del diritto costituzionale (At the borders of constitutional law. Works in 
honour of Valerio Onida (Milan: Giuffré, 2011) 731-733. 
 71. La Protection Pénale de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique sur Internet [The Criminal 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Property on the Internet]JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 




 72. In the case under examination, the conflict arises between the copyright – the author’s 
right to his intellectual property—and everyone’s right to be informed. Clearly unequal values are 
compared: one financial, and the other, a fundamental right. The latter, which would not be com-
parable with a value of a different nature in principle, is de facto widely sacrificed by both the 
French and Italian laws in favor of the right to an economic exploitation of intellectual work. An-
other flaw can be found considering that in this case, the measure of coexistence between con-
flicting values is a basic political issue. Therefore, it cannot be wholly entrusted to an authority, 
Court or I.R.A., and should be vested primarily upon a representative and politically responsible 
legislator. 
 73. See for examples of law clause the First Part ( Parte I), First Title ( Titolo I) of the Ital-
ian Constitution for the examples of the law clause. 
 74. The literature concerning the “rule of law” is unlimited. For present comparative pur-
poses it is sufficient to refer to scholarly contributions based on recent case law developments; 
see, among others, FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1st ed. 2014); DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 256-58 (3d ed. 2014); DAVID HARRIS ET AL., 
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 345-349 (2009). While for the specific 
sector of the media freedom see: HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON, MEDIA FREEDOM 
UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 37-311 (2006).  
 75. Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur H.R. Rep. 372 (¶ 87) (1980). 
 76. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 271 (¶ 49) (1980). 
 77. Well said by David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, & Edward Bates in LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 344 (2d ed.2009): “the rule need not be a rule of 
domestic law but may be a rule of international law or Community law so long as it purports to 
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ly are the Assembly’s legislative acts allowed to intervene, but the deci-
sions from the public authority (containing general and abstract provi-
sions) are permitted to as well.
78
 
The rule of law can therefore be summarized as upholding funda-
mental rights against the public powers’ arbitrary decisions
79
 in spite of 
its legal form, be it an act issued by the Parliament or by the Govern-
ment.
80
 This principle strengthens the protection of rights, namely in 
preventing the violation of liberties that may arise from a Parliamentary 
act, which does not comply with the standards of generality and ab-
stractness.
81
 Conversely, the same principle weakens this protection by 
allowing a secondary source to set out the discipline without any previ-
ous legislative intervention. 
B. From the “jurisdictional clause” to the due process 
Fundamental rights and liberties online can find within the Italian 
Constitution a second basic safeguard in the jurisdictional clause 
(“riserva di giurisdizione”, as explained elsewhere). This “riserva”, ap-
plying the principle of separation of powers,
82
 entrust the power of judi-
cial review solely upon the judiciary. 
The Italian Constitution provides a strong protection for the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. No political or administrative body is allowed 
to interfere with judicial functions,
83
 which must be carried on by exclu-
 
authorize the interference. It may consist of a whole legal regime regulating the area of activity, 
including rules made by a delegated rule-making authority (Barthold v FRG A90 (1985); 7 EHRR 
383 pagas 45-6 (1985) and rules from more than one legal order.” See also DANIEL MOECKLI ET 
AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 111 (2010).  
 78. Silver, 5 Eur H.R. Rep. at 372. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
271(¶ 47) (1979). For further doctrine examples, See HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON, 
MEDIA FREEDOM UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 47 (2006). 
 79. Kruslin v. France (1990) 1 EHRR 562, para. 30. 
 80. See Draft charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Brussel, 8 March 
2000 (13.03), a preview of what will then become Art. 53 of the Charter: «According to the 
European Conventions of Human Rights, the term ‘law’ must be understood in the material 
not the formal sense. It can cover sub-legislative, customary or case of law standard». 
 81. See generally Robert S. Summers, A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law, RATIO JURIS 
(1993). 
 82. For the purpose of this essay, a general definition of the principle of separation of pow-
ers will be adequate: a more or less rigid division of power between the Legislative, the Executive 
and the Judiciary aimed at the essential checks and balances required by democracy. For a supra-
national analysis beyond specific States, see CHRISTOPH MOELLERS, THE THREE 
BRANCHES: A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 150 (2013). 
 83. On the guaranteed independence of the judiciary power see, among the others: R. Guas-
tini, ‘Commento all’art. 101’, at G. Branca-A. Pizzorusso (eds), Commentario della Costituzione. 
La magistratura, vol. Ist, (Bologna-Roma, 1994) 172; F. Bartole, Autonomia e indipendenza 
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sively applying the law. This independence is the basic reason why only 
a judge is allowed to limit fundamental rights and liberties in compli-
ance with the law. One can see here that the jurisdictional clause and the 
law clause work in synergy. 
For this reason, a strong dissent should be expressed against 
84
 the 
Italian Legislative Decree n. 44/2010. 
The constitutionality of the Decree can be challenged on several 
grounds, one of which is found in the lack of compliance with the juris-
dictional clause. The power to “clean” the websites, ordering that a spe-
cific content be cancelled, is entrusted to an independent regulatory au-
thority. Since such an order inevitably affects the freedom of speech, a 
constitutionally sound solution would require a court proceeding and a 
judicial decision. The Decree’s provision may recall the French law 
Hadopi 1, before the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel and the 
subsequent modifications. 
On an international level, the jurisdictional clause is present. In the 
European Court of Human Rights’ decisions, for instance, it is in the 
weaker form of due process.
85
 In fact the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (especially, Articles. 5-6) does not force EU Member States 




dell’ordine giudiziario (Padova: Cedam 1964); C. Mezzanotte, ‘Sulla nozione d’indipendenza del 
giudice’, at B. Caravita di Toritto (ed), Magistratura, CSM e principi costituzionali (Bari: Laterza 
1994); A. Pizzorusso, ‘La Corte costituzionale ed il principio di indipendenza del giudice’, at 
Scritti su la giustizia costituzionale in onore di Vezio Crisafulli (Padova: Cedam, 1985).  
 84. Giovanna De Minico, Libertà e copyright nella Costituzione e nel Diritto dell’Unione  
(January 2014) [Fundamental Rights and Copyright in Italian Constitution and in the European 
System], available at http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/articolorivista/libert-e-
copyright-nella-costituzione-e-nel-diritto-dell-unione (last visited Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter De 
Minico, Fundamental Rights and Copyright]. 
For a sharp critique, see M. Avvisati, ‘Diritto d’autore in rete e Costituzione: concerto tra le 
fonti?’, 3 (2014) at http://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/component/docman/cat_view/199-note-e-
commenti. 
Pending the publication of this essay, the Decree was challenged on the grounds illustrated above 
before the Constitutional Court, see: Tar Lazio, sez.I  n. 10016 /2014 and n.10020/2014, at 
http://www.neldiritto.it/appgiurisprudenza.asp?id=10792#.VWYGbc_tmko 
 85. Being this topic only partially connected to our study it is enough here to refer to the 
same scholars quoted at note n. 87.  
 86. The concept of “judge” or “tribunal” is interpreted by the E.C.H.R. in an autonomous 
manner. In fact, in the Ringeisen case (ECHR, 16 July 1971, Ringeisen –Austria (Series A-16), 
parag. 94-95) the Court had to decide whether article six was applicable in an Austrian dispute 
concerning the purchase of property. The Court held that the administrative character of the Au-
thority was of little consequence, so it concluded that the body was a “tribunal.” In doctrine for 
all: F. Matscher, ‘La notion de ‘tribunal’ au sens de la Convention européenne des droit de 
l’homme’, in R. Koering-Jouklin, Les nouveaux développements du procès équitable au sens de 
la Convention européenne des droit de l’homme (Brussels: Bruylant, 1996), 33. 
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ties may be entrusted with the implementation of legal rules, provided 




What matters here is that the act concretely imposing limits will 
be adopted in an adversarial proceeding, allowing those who must 
bear those limits to have prompt knowledge of them in order to make 
their opposing arguments heard. And, should the relevant Authority, 
after the resolution of the conflicting issues, be convinced of the va-
lidity and truth of those limits, it will have to make the iter of its de-
cision understandable to all.
88
 Therefore, the interference with the 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s assets is accompanied by procedural 
guarantees ensuring a reasonable opportunity to make one’s case be-
fore the competent authorities.
89
 
This approach is considered a somewhat weaker one, as independ-
ence, impartiality, and neutrality - essential requisites for a fair assess-
ment of the parties’ dispute – are, in principle, more fully ensured by 
judges, although in different ways in different States. 
After examining the essential framework of the constitutional pro-
tection of rights and liberties in the Italian legal system, as well as in a 
comparative perspective, it is necessary to state a point: the underlying 
assumptions may be deemed valid for any legal system. As Fuller points 
out, laws must comply with some basic requirements, ensuring at least 
their legitimacy and efficiency.
90
 In this perspective, the existence of a 
territorial location may not be relevant. It can therefore be argued that 
the same framework applies to rights and liberties wherever they are ex-
ercised. Their nature or scope does not change when they move to the 
virtual world of the Internet, nor do they become any less fundamental. 
 
 87. The ECHR has developed its own substantive requirements for a “tribunal.” In particu-
lar, the body must have the power of decision; operate on the basis of rules of law and after pro-
ceedings conducted in a prescribed manner; determine matters within its competence; motivate its 
decisions and be independent and impartial. See MARTIN KUIJER, THE BLINDFOLD OF LADY 
JUSTICE: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY IN LIGHT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
ARTICLE 6 ECHR 175 (2004).  
 88. This is the case of the Independent Administrative Authorities. As I noted in a previous 
essay, although they do not belong to the judiciary power, they must motivate their decisions in 
order to allow a judicial review be conducted over them. G. DE MINICO, INDIPENDENZA DELLE 
AUTORITA O INDIPENDENZA DEI REGOLAMENTI? LETTURA IN PARALLELO ALL’ESPERIENZA 
COMUNITARIA’ [INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUTHORITIES OR INDEPENDENCE OF THE REGULATIONS? 
A COMPARATIVE READING WITH THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE],731(2011) [hereinafter De Mini-
co, A Comparative Reading].  
 89. The case law of the Eur. Ct. H.R. is synthesized in the decision of Agosi v. United 
Kingdom, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 55 (1986).  
 90. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 152-184 (1969). 
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The basic function of constitutional safeguards, aimed at preventing any 
breach of those rights, is equally confirmed. For example, freedom of 
speech in an online blog should be protected against ex ante controls as 
it is the case with the written speech of a book. In both cases the speech 
is addressed to an indefinite number of people and a similar damage 
would ensue from curtailing a speaker’s freedom. Therefore, no rational 
foundation may be indicated for a different definition or implementation 
of the constitutional framework. 
IV. FROM THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE INTERNET TO AN 
INTERNET BILL OF RIGHTS 
I started my discourse by denying the need for a formal modifica-
tion of the Constitutions in order to encompass the Internet. Significant 
similarities can be found in a compared reading of the North American 
and the European systems. It may now be useful to take a further step in 
stating the necessity of an “Internet Bill of Rights”.
91
 
Regulations of the Internet have so far been discussed through un-
derlining some common elements following a comparative perspective. 
It is this author’s argument that a global and rapidly changing reality 
shows a highly fragmented picture. More specifically, the mosaic of 
multiple State net regulations, filtered through widely different social, 
economic, and political conditions in different territories, cannot effec-
tively keep such a fast pace. Even more, the a-territorial nature of the 
Internet radically clashes per se with the limitations imposed by State 
boundaries.
92
 This suggests the increasing necessity of a set of basic 
rules that can be both generally accepted and acknowledged as a prima-
ry, binding source of law for all those public or private subjects interact-
ing with the Internet. 
There are a number of fundamental rights and liberties that already 
enjoy a constitutional protection in different legal systems, even in the 
absence of specific provisions concerning the Internet.
93
 But undoubted-
ly the Internet goes nowadays well beyond freedom of speech and 
communication, crucial as they may be in a democratic society. The In-
 
 91. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace,  45 Emory L.J. 3, 7-18 
(1996). 
 92. Allow me to refer to my analysis delivered in one of my books: INTERNET. REGOLA O 
ANARCHIA, quoted, p. 8. 
 93. This issue has already been dealt with at the beginning of this essay, where the only two 
Constitutions, containing explicit provisions for the Internet have been mentioned see supra note 
56. 
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ternet appears more and more as the most powerful tool ever forged for 
social inclusion and economic growth, which is exactly why the digital 
divide should be considered a decisive factor of inequality among coun-
tries and individuals. Such a scenario suggests that a conclusive and sat-
isfactory answer cannot be found in the interpretation—broad as it may 
be—of some constitutional provisions written at a time when there was 
no awareness of this new reality. 
This global situation does indeed urge a proper “Internet Bill of 
Rights”. In doing so, another question is then raised: who is the constit-
uent power of the Internet? In other words: which Authority shall be le-
gitimated
94
 to write the fundamental Charter of the Internet? 
It is clear from what I said before that the hypothesis of one or 
more national States assuming such a role must be rejected.
95
 The a-
territorial nature of the Internet would be incompatible with an Authori-
ty entrusted with powers constrained within State boundaries.
96
 The fea-
tures of the Internet require, as stated above, that only a supranational 
legislator should be called upon to write its Constitution. Even so, one 
question remains open: should such a legislator be an international body 
through an authoritative hard-law regulation, or should it rather be the 
community of Internet ‘surfers’ through self-regulation? The former 
have frequently proven to be unable to build the consensus necessary to 
condense and shape the common good in a supranational synthesis.
97
 
Furthermore, they fall easily under the influence of strong national 
States, the interests of which only occasionally coincide with a broader 
common good.
98
 In brief, international organizations tend to reproduce, 
albeit on a smaller scale, the basic flaw of world politics, a system of in-
teractions between autonomous nation-States at best. In this framework, 
 
 94. RUDOLF W. RIJGERSBERG, The State of Interdependence. Globalization, Internet and 
Constitutional Governance 49-68 & 213-30 (Hague: Asser Press, 2010). 
 95. See infra 
 96. CHRIS REED, MAKING LAWS FOR CYBERSPACE 30-34 (2012). 
 97. See Teubner G., Constitutional Fragments, 66. 
 98. There is no unanimous definition of the “common good.” For example: W. Streeck - P. 
C. Schmitter, Community, market, state – and associations? The prospective contribution of in-
terest governance to social order, quoted, 16, strongly believes in “the public use of private inter-
est governments [. . .] which are made subservient to general interests by appropriately designed 
institutions”. On the contrary, C. A. MORAND, La contractualisation corporatiste de la formation 
et de la mise en oeuvre du droit, in L’ETAT PROPULSIF. CONTRIBUTION A L’ETUDE DES 
INSTRUMENTS D’ACTION DE L’ETAT 209 (Paris: Publisud, 1991), states that “L’éclatement de 
l’intérêt général en une multitude d’intérêts particuliers et sectorialisés remet en cause l’une des 
justifications fondamentale de l’exercise du pouvoir étatique, son orientation vers la réalisation de 
l’intérêt public. » 
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international organizations have revealed themselves incapable to re-
place the culture of nation-States with a new one. 
Therefore, the idea of an Internet Bill of Right written by its own 
people, entrusting regulation to an endogenous process of self-
organization, might gain some ground. Effective examples can be of-
fered by institutions such as ICANN,
99
 courts of arbitration, or interna-
tional standardization organizations such as the World Wide Web Con-
sortium. This is a better solution as to the need of effective supra-
nationality. New problems, however, arise, since it refers to a plurality 




Considering the current situation, the risk of a “corporate constitu-
tionalism” cannot be overlooked.
101
 As Teubner stated, such a risk is in-
herent whenever well-structured and significantly funded private bodies 
enter the field.
102
 The Internet may very well be the “most prominent 
case of constitutional law created through multinational corporations 
private ordering.”
103
 And even if all stereotypes should be refused, cor-
porate constitutionalism will undoubtedly be accompanied by “the 
glimmering of the constitution of multi-national enterprises as an auton-
omous community of entities that have begun to regulate themselves 




The risk underlined by Teubner should not be underestimated. A 
private interest government, to use an expression familiar to some 
scholars,
105
 is entrusted with social tasks if it enacts regulations affecting 
not only their associates, but also third parties. This is not the case of a 
regulatory power bestowed on the decision makers through a contractu-
 
 99. About ICANN governance see: M. Hutter, Global regulation of the Internet domaine 
name system: five lessons from the ICANN Case, in Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed), [Innovationsoffene 
Regulierung des Internet:Neues Recht für Kommunikationsnetzwerke] (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2003), 39-52. 
The French delegation to ICANN’s 50th meeting, taking place in London, recently stated that 
“U.S.-based ICANN is unfit for ‘Internet governance’”:  
 100. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 69-79 (2001). 
 101. G. TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
GLOBALIZATION 56 (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012). 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Larry Cata Backer, The Autonomous Global Enterprise: On the Role of Organizational 
Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. REV. 541, 567 (2006). 
 105. See Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter, Community, Market, State—and Associ-
ations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order, 1 EUR. SOC. REV. 
119, 127 (1985) available at http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/2/119.full.pdf. 
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al obligation where members involved accept the rules. Instead, were a 
private interest government to enact and enforce those rules applicable 
to everyone working in the field beyond the relevant social group of 
stipulating members, a basic issue of democracy arises. In such cases, 
the consensus within the social group will not give the regulator an ade-
quate and proper basis to adopt acts affecting third parties per se. The 
issues of representativeness and democratic governance are paramount, 
as they ultimately define the interaction among the conflicting interests 
underlying the rules to be drawn.
106
 
Therefore, I propose a median hypothesis. First, the legislative 
power should be vested in a public supranational authoritative body, 
based on legal and binding provisions, which also defines the nature and 
scope of its powers. Second, the decision-making process of such a 
body should encompass a strong representation of private interests con-
cerning the Internet such as entrepreneurs, web surfers, and consumers. 
The basic model could be drawn to resemble the notice and comment 
procedure, well-known to the American experience in the field of regu-
lations.
107
 Opposing stakeholders should discuss basic issues before a 
public authority, who is able to make the final decision after the differ-
ent views have been listened to and fully taken into account. The prob-
lems of standing and those concerning the choice of interests to be ad-
mitted to such a procedure have been extensively explored by the 
American doctrine, which could be a reference on this point.
108
 
The model proposed here would answer the questions on rule 
maker legitimacy as it would be based on formally legal provisions. It 
would also offer at least a partial answer to the doubts aroused by the 
possibility that the supranational body be captured by the interests of the 
stronger national States participating in its decisions. Such a risk is re-
duced by the fact that the private competing interests taking part in the 
decision may formally have a territorial or national identity, but this will 
not decisively affect their interests or policies. 
 
 106. LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 230 (New Haven-
London: Yale University Press, 2014), focuses on the fact that the multi-stakeholder model isn’t 
good per sé, unless it is based on the democratic values: amongst them, representativeness and 
equilibrate balance of powers between public and private actors. 
 107. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 108. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY 869-881 4th ed. 1998); see Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 
447 (1986); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 
TULSA L.J. 185 (1996); and see Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 203 (1996). 
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The issue of a constituent power for the Internet may currently ap-
pear far-fetched, but it is actually something already in agenda, although 
the attempts to reach a widespread consensus on some basic issues have 
failed up to now as it has recently happened in Dubai
109




V. WHAT SHOULD THE ARCHITECTURE OF AN INTERNET BILL OF RIGHTS 
BE LIKE? 
Although the idea of a supranational constitutional legislator for 
the Internet may appear unrealistic in the current situation, the need for 
a set of commonly accepted basic rules is clear and immediately pre-
sent. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a number of States can 
reach an agreement on those basic rules. Several attempts have been and 
are being made to this purpose.
111
 Should such an agreement be reached, 
a set of substantially constitutional rules, binding each State in force of 
an international treaty, would be laid down. Therefore, an analysis of 
the contents of an Internet Bill – however formulated and enacted – de-
 
 109. Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Final Acts of the World Conference On International Tel-
ecommunications, I.T.U. 37779 (Dec. 3-14, 2012), available at http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-
12/Documents/final-acts-wcit-12.pdf. 
 110. Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, NETmundial 
Draft Outcome Document Public Consultation: final report on comments, (April 22, 2014), 
available at http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundialPublicConsultation-
FinalReport20140421.pdf [hereinafter NETmundial Internet Governance Report]. 
 111. The recent Internet Governance Forum has moved in this direction, but without reaching 
any results at the moment, Connecting Continents for Enhanced Multistakeholder Internet Gov-
ernance, Istanbul-Turk., 2-5 September 2014, at http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf-2014. 
Concerning the Italian experience, a recent and most significant development is found in the 
Draft Declaration of Internet Rights 
(http://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/upload_file/upload_files/
000/000/189/dichiarazione_dei_diritti_internet_inglese.pdf) elaborated by a special Committee, 
appointed by the president of the Chamber of Deputies (on. L. Boldrini) 
(http://www.camera.it/leg17/1177). The Committee’s work is still in progress, and is intended to 
provide the Italian Government with a technical and political basis for the promotion of promote 
an International Bill of rights. The overall results achieved so far can be considered satisfactory, 
although some provisions may appear to be insufficient and inadequate (see the comments of 
prof. De Minico, member of the Committee, in meeting n. 3, Oct. 8
th
, 2014, at   
http://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/attivita_commissione_inte
rnet/files/000/000/003/resoconto_commissione_8ottobre.pdf (pp. 27-30). While this was being 
revised for print, the final draft of the Declaration of Interent Rights has been approved on July 
28, 2015: http://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/commissione_internet/testo_ 
definitivo_inglese.pdf. This latest version takes into account the suggestions and proposals, mine 
included, arising from the debate within the Committee. The results of a wide public consultation 
have also been considered. Conclusively, the document can be deemed to be a well-balanced 
compromise among different positions, as a constitutional inspiration should always bear. 
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serves to be pursued and is becoming more than a purely speculative 
exercise. 
For the reasons discussed before, such a Bill should tackle two is-
sues. Firstly, it should state that the conflict between opposite values 
must be resolved according to the prevalence of individual rights over 
economic liberties. Secondly, it should resolve the relationship between 
the binding sources and self-regulation with the prevalence of the for-
mer over the latter. Reference could be made here to the European Con-
vention of Human Rights and European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
to point out at least three other more specific guarantees aimed at con-
straining the rulemaking power of policymakers: necessity, indispensa-
bility, and proportionality, extensively recalled by the two European 
Courts (Eur. Ct. H.R. and ECJ).
112
 The language used by both is not al-
ways coincident, but it does not seem necessary to delve into the matter 
here.
113
 I simply want to underline the fact that the discretionary power 
of the legislator is anything but undefined both in the European and in 
the International case law.
114
 
The first limit, i.e. necessity, is a one-way approach, requiring the 
sacrifice of a right to be accepted only if it cannot be avoided. Con-
versely, the sacrifice cannot be accepted if an alternative in which that 
 
 112. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW. TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS, 396-400 
(5
th
 ed. 2008), in which the authors state that “Article 52(1) of the European Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, which draws on the jurisprudence of both the ECHR and the ECJ, contains a gen-
eral derogation clause, indicating the nature of restrictions on Charter rights will be acceptable.”  
For a criticism to this thesis see: D. Triantafyllou, The European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the “Rule of law”. Restricting fundamental rights by reference, at (2002) 39 CMLR 53 
 113. On the complex relationship between the ECHR and the ECJ see, from a large literature: 
G. Harpaz, The European Court of Justice and its relationship with the European Court of Hu-
man Rights: the question of enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy (2009) 46 MLR 105; F. 
Callewaert, The European Court Human Rights and European Union law: a long way to harmo-
ny (2009) 6 EHRLR 768-783.  
 114. Concerning the Eur. Ct. H.R., it has long accorded to the State Parties a margin of ap-
praisal in making public decisions, which potentially influence ECHR (see, eg. Handyside v. 
United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499#{“itemid”:[“001-57499”]}). 
The extent of the margin allowed by the court varies according to the policy area in question; for 
example, it is usually wider in economic or national security issues, and narrow in the area of 
criminal justice. As to the ECJ, it has also allowed Member States some discretion on their deci-
sion-making, stating that EU law does not impose upon the Member States an uniform scale of 
values as regards the assessment of conduct which may be considered contrary to public policy 
(Adoui and Cournuaille v Belgium, (Cases 115 e 116/81) [1982] ECR 1665 (par. 8)) at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61981CJ0115&from=EN. For an exten-
sive overview on recent cases see: E. BERRY, M. J. HOMEWOOD & B. BOGUSZ, EU LAW 306 (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
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same right remains unfettered is viable.
115
 
The second limit, indispensability, is an instance of common 
ground between the Italian Constitutional Court
116
 and the European 
Court of Human Rights.
117
 The former has defined this limit as the 
“minimum essential content” for rights, up to the point of inducing part 
of the doctrine to consider the necessity a “limit to the limit.”
118
 Conclu-
sively, no such restriction is allowed as to substantially extinguish the 
right, no matter how essential the interest pursued by the legislator may 
be. 
The third limit, proportionality,
119
 is the real test for the reasona-
bleness of any legal provision. Costs and benefits must be assessed in 
order to check that a proper balance has been found between the inter-
ests embodied in the protected rights and those on which the legislative 
restriction is founded.
120
 The goal is to prevent limitations to rights, 





 115. See RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 339-40 
(2nd ed. 2009). 
 116. Corte Cost., Cass., 22 febbraio 1990, 67 (It.) available at 
http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1990/0067s-90.html. 
 117. The determination of the objective pursued by the restriction to a fundamental right may 
be decisive to answer the question whether the limitation may be considered ‘necessary in a dem-
ocratic society’, i.e. such a necessity must go beyond the mere need to achieve that aim. (See the 
leading case: ECHR, (plen.) Open door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 1992, Series A no. 
246-A, par. 64, at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57789#{“itemid”:[“001-57789”]})  
 118. Massimo Luciani, l diritti fondamentali come limiti alla revisione dela costituzione, in 
LIBERTÀ E GIURISPRUDENZA CONSTITUZIONALE 121-129 (Vittorio Angiolini ed., 1992). This 
expression is also common among Spanish scholars, ex multis, see Antonio-Luis Martínez-
Pujalte, La garantía del contenido esencial de los derechos fundamentales, in  CUADERNOS Y 
DEBATES 65, 6 (1997). 
 119. JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN, FAIR BALANCE: PROPORTIONALITY, SUBSIDIARITY AND 
PRIMARITY IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Alastair Mowbray, A 
Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV., 2, 289 (2010). 
 120. Mowbray supra note 119. 
 121. Court of Justice, Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Com-
ponisten en Uitgevers (SABAM) v Netlog NV (16 Febrary 2012), para. 51, at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119512&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2210378 . 
For a specific reference to data retention and electronic communications see recently:  
Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) (8 April 2014), in Joined Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=150642&doclang=EN. 
In particular, in the paragraphs n. 46, 69 e 70 the Court recalls its previous decisions and finds in 
the violation of proportionality a conclusive reason for the  invalidity of Data Retention Directive 
(2002/58).   
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A regulation which does not comply with the aforesaid principles 
may be found in the Hadopi 2. The law fails on at least three different 
grounds. Firstly, it balances heterogeneous values: a fundamental right 
(to access) vs. an economic interest (copyright). Secondly, it charges the 
former (the fundamental right) with excessive and disproportionate 
bounds. Finally, the restrictions laid down do not prove to be necessary. 
A support for this conclusion may be inferred from a report showing 
that the law has been unsuccessful in educating consumers to a lawful 
use of the Internet. 
On the contrary the English High Court does not seem to share 
such a viewpoint: in fact, it has not hesitated to block alleged terrorist 
access to the Internet in order to avoid the danger of dissemination of 
certain ideas.
122
 In this judicial balancing between fundamental values, a 
right is denied tout court on the occurrence not of immediate and cur-
rent damage, but rather of the risk of its future occurrence.
123
 Therefore, 
the High Court is disregarding two impassable limits safeguarding fun-
damental rights, putting the legitimacy of its ruling under European le-
gal standards at serious risk. 
Finally, I find a substantial support to my claims in the action of 
the ECtHR,
124
 as quoted above. Limitations on fundamental rights and 
liberties may be allowed only if indispensable, not differently avoidable, 
and a correct and proportionate balance is found between the competing 
interests. This clear conclusion should contribute to the core of an Inter-
net Bill such as it is proposed in this paper. More detailed rules could be 
left to self-regulation, in coherence with the opinion – set forth in this 
paper - that maintaining the legally binding rules to a minimum is the 
best choice for the Internet. 
VI. EQUALITY ON THE INTERNET: MYTH OR REALITY? 
I have underlined the need for a “Bill of Rights” tailored to the In-
ternet, entrusted to a supranational legislator. I wish to point out now 
that two preliminary requirements should be met. 
Firstly, the legislator should resort in its own rulemaking to 
self-defining concepts rather than to general clauses, and to substan-
tive regulation instead of uncertain and general principles inevitably 
in need of broad interpretations. Secondly, the legislator should re-
 
 122. AM vs. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. [2001] EWHC 2486 A.C. available at 
www.bailii.org.. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Infra at 115, 117 and 119. 
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turn each actor, be it public or private, to its own domain, returning 
political choice to the policy-makers, wresting it back both from In-
dependent Authorities and private powers, to which it has been en-
trusted through a broad delegation by policy-makers. This approach 
would allow Authorities to be entrusted with tasks more appropriate 
to their institutional position, involving no political responsibility. At 
the same time, the judicial power would be called to apply rules suf-
ficiently defined in their content, enforcing the political project 
sketched out by the legislator, rather than starting one ex novo. 
A final question arises: is there a set of values, which the legis-
lator will have to accept and enforce in drawing up a discipline well 
suited to the Internet? In my opinion, such a set of values does exist 
even now: it is made up of the principles of modern constitutionalism 
commonly shared in the European and Anglo-American experience, 
although it is clear that these principles must be rethought on the ba-
sis of the peculiarities of the Internet.
125
 
The first and paramount value to be taken into account is equali-
ty, which should thus be the keystone of a regulatory framework for 
the Internet. The virtual world is - no less than the real one - marked 
by strong inequalities, to be compensated with asymmetric regulation 
in bonam partem.
126
 This concept leads to rules intended to promote 
weaker social categories in need of an additional protection in order 
that a greater equality may be effectively pursued. 
This is the foremost challenge of the Internet. 
The infinite possibilities of a better quality of life, better ser-
vices, greater knowledge generated by the network must represent a 
chance for social redemption for those who so far have not been al-
lowed to share economic prosperity and social inclusion. This is even 
more important because - in a world marked by increasing inequali-
ties, which are a serious threat to the future of us all - the network 
proposes itself as the only tool potentially able to reverse the trend, 
even offering a new model of peaceful coexistence. In this sense, In-
ternet can become the cornerstone of modern democracies, no less 
than the freedom of speech and of the press has already been in the 
 
 125. In the same direction indicated above see J. Rowbottom, In the shadow of the Big Me-
dia: Freedom of expression, Participation and the Production of Knowledge Online, 3 PUBLIC 
LAW, 509 (2014). 
 126. Giovanna De Minico, The 2002 EC Directives Telecommunications: Regime up to the 
2008 Ongoing Revision – Have the Goals been Reached? 19 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 657, 658-59 
(2008). 
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past. 
The goal of equality means that the Internet must be redeemed 
from the narrow image of a ‘land’ populated only by selfish myths of 
liberalism. Internet must be defended as the largest public space that 
humanity has ever had to gain experience of civic virtues and poli-
cies. 
The issue of equality can be summarized in the right for citizens 
to access the Internet, for operators to next generation networks and, 
ultimately, for consumers to services.
127
 The right of citizens’ access 
consists in the universal provision of fast connection, regardless of 
location or income of the net-citizens. The right of operators aims to 
assure that network architecture is easily accessible to the non-owner 
operators. The right of the consumers to services meets the need to 
provide consumers with a broad choice between plural products of-
fered by different economically independent entrepreneurs, in oppo-
sition to the substantial oligopoly of the giants of the network. 
The goal of equality can only be pursued fighting powerful en-
emies. Its achievement is not a natural and predictable outcome of 
technical progress, which is not inherently oriented in a unique and 
predetermined direction. I am disputing the argument that the so 
called Lex Informatica
128
 could be a primary and automatic source of 
a rule-making oriented per se and by default to the common good. 
Such a result may be obtained only if the policymaker has pursued 
equality as a specific goal, and has consequently provided effective 
means to achieve it. The preliminary choice of the goal that the tech-
nique should achieve belongs to the author of the rule, together with 
the accountability for the choice itself. 
The best choice is found focusing on the recipient of the benefit 
provided by the technique. Should it be the weaker subject, or the al-
ready stronger one? In the first case, the technique will be the driving 
force for socially well-distributed growth; in the second case, the 
same will be the multiplier of well-being in favour of those who are 
already advantaged per se. 
I can find immediate examples in the access to the broadband, 
not yet promoted as a universal service; in the architecture of the 
 
 127. Another work develops a wider and more comprehensive analysis of equality and the 
Internet: G. De Minico, INTERNET. REGOLA E ANARCHIA [INTERNET. RULES AND ANARCHY], 
chapters II and III. 
 128. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998). 
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Next generation networks designed in favour of the ex-incumbent; or 
in the absence of regulation to guarantee net neutrality.
129
 The exam-
ination of national legislation and implementation measures is disap-
pointing, since it shows that the conflict between the under-protected 
categories – such as new operators, netizens, children - and the eco-
nomic interests of communication enterprises has been basically re-
solved in favour of the latter.
130
 The law of the market seems to have 
won in the end. Because of that, the weaker parties do not receive the 
additional protection that they would deserve in accordance with the 
network promoted as the new lever of modern constitutionalism. To 
this end, what should the supranational legislator do? 
As a priority, asymmetrical rules should be adopted with the 
purpose of reversing the current trend in favour of adult users, opera-
tors in dominant position, citizens already provided with a connec-
tion. The regulatory focus should be re-oriented in favour of chil-
dren, neo-entrants entrepreneurs and citizens who cannot afford a 
connection at market prices. 
The unbalanced relationship now in existence between the weak 
categories and communication enterprises is to be overturned. This 
would also be in accordance with the social mission to such enter-
prises should in principle already obey.
131
 The point is that the com-
 
 129. The theme of net neutrality would deserve an autonomous work. Within the scope of this 
essay I refer to note 38 for its definition and to notes 39 and 40 for recent developments due to the 
procedures pending before F.C.C..  For a closer examination see especially: S. Zack, 
REGULATING THE WEB: NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND THE FATE OF THE OPEN INTERNET, (Plym-
outh: Lexington Books, 2013); A.C. Firth . – N. H. Pierson. (eds), THE OPEN INTERNET, NET 
NEUTRALITY AND THE FCC (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2011); T. W. Hazlett., THE 
FALLACY OF NET NEUTRALITY, (New York: Encounter Books, 2011); C. T. Marsden, NET 
NEUTRALITY: TOWARDS A CO-REGULATORY SOLUTION, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010); 
D. C. Nunziato Virtual freedom: net neutrality and free speech in the Internet age, (Stanford: Cal-
ifornia Stanford Law Books, 2009); J. Zittrain, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO 
STOP IT, (New Haven - London: Yale University Press, 2009). 
 130. Should it still be necessary, a further example may be found in the issue between the 
protection of the children and the promotion of the enterprises operating in Internet. In this que-
relle the former value has been sacrificed in favour of economic interests. In fact, the protections 
against offence speeches and hard images offered by filters have not been enough, the auto-
declaration of the age requested by Facebook and Twitter is ridiculous, the selective surf is not 
practicable. These defeatsare not due to a deficiency of technique, but to the weakness of political 
projects in favour of children as compared with the strong economic interests involved. I have 
dealt with this issue in a previous essay: ‘Il favor constitutionis e il minore: realtà o fantasia?’ 
(The Favor Constitutionis and the child: reality or mere fantasy? at G. De Minico (ed), Nuovi me-
dia e minori, [New Media and children] (Roma: Aracne, 2012) 35-42. 
 131. I refer to a “social mission” because this particular organization of persons and means 
operates in the market of ideas. So it has a direct effect on the process of shaping individual con-
sciences and public opinion in general. Such a scope justifies the particular regime, which this 
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munication enterprises have been detached from the common good 
following an incorrect concept of the market economy that reduces 
public intervention to ultra-minimal standards. We are currently fac-
ing a poor imitation of the Smithian chimera of an automatic harmo-
ny between public and individual interests: a myth to which not even 
Smith – in my opinion - seemed to believe fully.
132
 
New concepts are required if the Internet is to be regulated in co-
herence with the values of equality and individual rights. These values 
are the only ones able to ensure that technological progress ends up in a 
chance of growth for all, aligning the weak categories with the well-




kind of enterprise should be submitted to. 
 132. G. Kennedy, Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand: From Metaphor to Myth 6 ECON. 
JOURNAL WATCH, 2, 250 (2009). The author clearly explains that Smith had never said that pub-
lic and private interests could combine each other by the default “wholly misleading belief of how 
commercial markets function”, because instead the intervention of the State would be necessary 
to this end. For a different perspective see: D. B. Klein, In Adam Smith’s Invisible Hands: Com-
ment on Gavin Kennedy 6 ECON JOURNAL WATCH, 2,264-279 (2009). 
